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It is anticipated that the introduction of metacomputing and distributed resource management mecha-
nisms to the Internet and World Wide Web will make available to users and applications a large diversity 
of previously unavailable network and computing resources. New methods of managing the scheduling 
and allocation of distributed resources bring into focus new problems and approaches for managing 
security in those contexts. We present an analysis of layered and variable security services and re-
quirements. These services and requirements may be accessed via a network control program such as a 
Resource Management System (RMS) which is responsible for scheduling resources in distributed hetero-
geneous environments. The RMS will not present the same "virtual computer/network" to the same job 
each time it is submitted for execution. Each instance will be comprised of potentially different actual re-
sources with different properties. Our objective is to understand how user and application requirements, 
characterized as choices and limits, can affect the overall security provided. A method is presented for 
fairly measuring the effectiveness of an RMS in performing security allocation and assignments with 
respect to security choices made by metacomputer users and applications. 1 
Keywords: Quality of Security Service, Resource Management System 
1 Introduction: Managing Metacomputer Resource Allocation 
Metacomputing provides users and applications with access to a virtual machine consisting of a wide range 
of distributed networking and computing resources (see e.g., [15]). Initially, efforts in metacomputing were 
focussed on providing transparent access to remote supercomputers for their user communities and support 
organizations. The advent of standardized protocols for (1) managing production and transmission of multi-
media data [16], and (2) the more general distribution and execution of remote code (e.g. via the World Wide 
1This work was supported under the MSHN Project of the DARPA/ITO Quorum Program 
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Web, Java, or Jini) may help to enable the vision of metacomputing to extend to devices and computational 
resources that are generally available on the Internet. 
Whereas current distributed systems and internet technology may import mobile code for local execution 
(e.g., via Java applet), or request that remote code be executed in its native (fixed) environment (e.g., via 
servelets or object request brokers), metacomputing expands this paradigm to include execution of mobile 
code utilizing a wide range of possible remote resources. In some sense, recent Jini (Sun) and Universal 
Plug-and-Play (MS) technologies enable some metacomputing functions, but they may lack the ability to 
optimize multi-task scheduling or Quality of Service, or to adapt to changing resource availability. 
The resources available on a metacomputing virtual machine are both local and remote; are implemented 
in hardware as well as software; and include processing, storage, and display devices. The heterogeneity 
[4], multiplicity and remoteness of these resources provides various management, scheduling and security 
challenges [5, 2]. Of specific concern for this paper is the fact that the metacomputer presents too many 
variables and choices for users or applications to manage without automated support. 
Resource Management Systems (RMSs) are designed to provide efficient, automated management and 
allocation decisions for metacomputer resources [9, 8]. Allocation decisions involve matching requirements 
to capabilities and attributes for security [3], completion time, computational environment [12], network 
bandwidth, etc. The efficiency of an RMS in providing these type of decisions can be measured with respect 
to various user and system goals, for example, quality of service (QoS) specifications and system allocation 
policies [11, 16]. The relationship of the RMS to the metacomputer is shown in Figure 1, where P indicates 














































Figure 1: Metacomputing and the RMS 
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1.1 QoS Choices 
Quality of Service refers to the ability of a system to provide services such that user expectations for time-
liness and performance quality are met. For example, a multimedia application should deliver video frames 
so that the display is jitter-free [16, 6]. Quality of service can be provided at several levels within the overall 
system. The notion of translucence, where components can adapt to changing conditions at one or more 
other levels, results in a problem that is both horizontal, viz. distributed across the network; and vertical, 
viz. distributed within the stack. Finally quality of service requirements may change in systems supporting 
dynamic policies based upon current operating modes, e.g. normal, impacted or crisis [3]. 
Users have expectations with respect to the security services they are provided. These expectations may 
include both functional and assurance characteristics. With respect to security for a particular job, a user 
might require a minimum level of both functional mechanism and assurance. The ability of the network to 
meet these requirements is measured in terms of Quality of Security Service (QoSS) [3]. The notion of net-
work Quality of Security Service expands the network service choices available through the metacomputer, 
providing administrators and users with more flexibility and potentially better service, without compromise 
of network and system security policies. 
1.2 Security Ranges 
As introduced in [3, 11], the security requirements presented to a network application can allow a range 
of security behavior. For example, a security policy for a hypothetical sub-network requires IP packet 
encryption. In this sub-net, a commercial multimedia application exports digital images (e.g., movies, or 
high-resolution fine art images). However, recognizing that the application in this specific environment 
can tolerate a media stream which is periodically encrypted (viz., one yielding a suitably obscured image, 
which would render a stolen image unsalable), the policy may only require that a range of from 80% to 
100% of the packets should be encrypted. (Note that in some risk models, such a periodic encryption 
method might require fortified protection against cryptanalysis. In addition, care must be taken to ensure 
that in five repeated transmissions the entire unencrypted image is revealed.) 
Collaborative applications, for which video teleconferencing with shared electronic white boards and 
application suites represent current technology, present another example in which security choices are avail-
able to the participants. Suppose that today one party in the group is located at organizational headquarters 
while another is a "road-warrior" participating from a hotel room in a foreign country known for govern-
ment support of corporate espionage. Clearly the security requirements and choices of the road-warrior will 
be quite different than those chosen tomorrow when all participants will be in "friendly" territory. When 
a remote user is involved, collaborators may demand increased levels of both confidentiality and integrity 
support. 
Consider the security administrator's or the user's motivation in agreeing to or specifying a range of 
security protection. As with multimedia image resolution, users will generally desire the greatest amount 
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of security (or image fidelity) available, but this desire is tempered by cost. Cost may may take the form 
of monetary charges or performance degradation, for example. When cost is very high (e.g., slow image 
display), users may be willing to accept degraded security or imagry, instead. 
Yet, once a user (or security officer) decides on the minimum level of security required for a given ap-
plication, why would they ever agree to more security, if it increases their cost? For one, an application may 
have variable data formats, which may have correspondingly variable security requirements. A degraded 
image might require less security, and conversely, the enhanced image might be more security sensitive. To 
illustrate this example, a range of fidelity/security is shown in Table I: 
Table 1: Security Ranges 
I Fidelity I Security I Performance J 
high high low 
medium medium medium 
low low high 
Another example is that the underlying system might support different situational modes. For some 
modes (e.g., "emergency"), the user or administrator may be willing to accept more (or less) security for 
a given application. The management of mode and security-level negotiation is handled automatically by 
some resource management systems [9]. 
Yet another scenario is that the underlying control program may have more flexibility to execute the 
job quickly, or at all, if the user can live with a range of security requirements. For example, transmission 
paths may go through a wide range of security environments. So the user specifies: do what you need to 
do, but give me at least "this much" security. The application might even execute faster with more security; 
regardless, the RMS manages the security allocation within the bounds specified by the user. 
From the system's point of view, as opposed to that of the user, security variability provides another 
tradeoff factor, allowing the system to be more flexible in providing QoS for the system as a whole. 
Here are some other examples of security ranges with examples of how the ranges could be character-
ized: 
• strength of cryptographic algorithm 
- e.g., RSA, DES, etc., where strength might be measured in terms of the work factor associated 
with a brute force attack 
• Length of cryptographic key 
- characterized by bit-length 
• percentage ofpackets authenticated [14] 
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- characterized by percentage oftotal{e.g., a multimedia environment might tolerate a percentage 
of data modification or loss) 
• Security functions present in destination job-execution environment 
- characterized by operating system or boundary control security policy enforcement mechanisms 
• Confidence of policy-enforcement in remote login environment 
- characterized by 3rd-party evaluation 
• robustness of authentication mechanism 
- here the range might span weak password, strong password, biometric, and smart cards with 
on-board display and input interfaces 
As one last example, consider a network consisting of various subnets. One of these subnets could be 
known to be toxic to the interests of the host enterprise, as in a subnet of nodes within a hostile country. Now, 
the toxic subnet could be identified by ID or by a security rating, and application or enterprise policies could 
prohibit routing through, execution within, or logon to such a subnet, by specifying allowed or disallowed 
sets of subnets. 
1.3 Goal: Effective Security with regard to QoS Choices 
As stated above, network services may allow security ranges. These ranges provide the RMS with additional 
variables to consider in scheduling and balancing its various requirements. The RMS may allow users and 
applications to indicate a choice or preference within any of the security ranges. As with other QoS factors, 
the RMS may modify the level of security service within this range in order to balance other factors, e.g., 
completion time. 
We desire to be able to measure the level of security provided by the RMS in managing the tasks and 
resources for which it is responsible. Our general approach will be to summarize the level of security service 
supplied across all scheduled tasks. This metric should give maximum credit to the RMS when it maximizes 
the security provided to the overall network (i.e., the sum of the network applications). Additionally, we 
would like to factor user and application security choices into the RMS measurement model so that, if the 
user asks for, and is provided, less security service than the maximurr1 for a given range, the RMS is not 
penalized with respect to the metric. 
The rest of this paper provides a description of how user and application choices in the context ofQoSS 
can be understood to affect the overall service provided by an RMS. A set of definitions and conceptual 
framework for reasoning about the QoSS problem is introduced in Section 2. A more formal presentation 
' 
of choices and restrictions within the context of an RMS is presented in Section 3. Finally, our conclusions 
and future work are found in Section 4. 
The Effects of Security Choices and Limits in a Metacomputing Environment 6 
2 Network System Model 
In order to reason about the defined problem we will first establish a definitional framework. 
2.1 Security Resources, Services and Requirements 
A network system is the infrastructure consisting of the totality of network -accessible resources and secu-
rity services. A security service is a high-level abstract resource providing security functionality such as: 
authentication, auditing, privacy, integrity, intrusion detection, non-repudiation, and traffic flow confiden-
tiality [3]. A security service typically consumes other low-level system resources such CPU, memory, disk, 
and network bandwidth. For example, the Common Data Security Architecture (CDSA) [10, 13] describes 
modules each of which contain specific security mechanisms to provide some of these services. 
Each such resource and service may embody security requirements. A requirement may restrict the 
availability of a resource to an external entity. Some restrictions might be the typical MAC and DAC 
requirements, or other security constraints, e.g.: encryption available 9 P.M. to 5 A.M., range of available 
encryption algorithms, and range of required key lengths. 
An implemented security mechanism functions as either a service or a requirement. For example, sup-
pose that a user wishes to access a database within a protected subnet. To access this subnet all packets 
must be digitally signed using HMAC-SHA. The need to digitally sign all packets entering the subnet is 
a requirement imposed in order to access the database. The user may choose to not access the database 
because of this imposed requirement. In contrast, if a user has a requirement for data authenticity, he will 
choose to access the database resource within the protected subnet and will choose to use a local packet 
authentication service in order to transmit packets with the required signatures. 
2.2 Variant Security 
To be general, we will define that all security requirements have a range of permissible behavior. That is, 
a range may be unitary, or degenerate, in which case it represents no choice. Where a range represents a 
choice, the requirement is termed security variant. All system security services are security variant: since 
they are invoked at the discretion of the user or application, the range is at least binary (i.e, invoked or not 
invoked). Some requirements are unitary, while others are variant. 
2.3 Task Sequences 
In the theory of metacomputing, applications may be broken up into subtasks each of which may be executed 
on different topographical network elements, the results of which are in some way logically joined by the 
metacomputer [1]. Depending on the metacomputing mechanism used, the topographical structure and the 
location of specific elements may be more or less transparent to the end user. For the work discussed in 
this paper, we make the simplifying assumption that a task is an application invoked by a user, and each 
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such distributed subtask (if present) is a logically separate task. The task utilizes various network system 
services and resources. The utilization is intermediated by the RMS. Thus, a task is invoked in a sequence: 
• the user activates the application through some interface with an application manager (OS, browser, 
etc.); 
• the application is intermediated by the RMS; and 
• the RMS submits the application to the system. 
We call this the task invocation sequence: 
user => application => RM S => system2 
Security requirements may be established or refined by any or all of: the user, the application, the RMS, 
and the system. We designate these entities as security requirement providers. 
As an example of how a requirement can be refined within the task invocation sequence, consider how 
a typical application offers the user a choice for some service. If the user does not indicate a choice, the 
application uses some default value. If the user chooses a range, the application invokes itself with a partic-
ular value within that range (the application's choices may be managed by a handler or wrapper). Similarly, 
the RMS may refine the application's choice, for example, to optimize metacomputer performance, load 
balancing, etc. 
In a task invocation sequence, the request is passed from left to right, from a previous requirement 
provider, and to the next provider. A security choice for each variant security requirement is logically 
included with each request step. The choice may be implicit or explicit. For example, if no explicit choice 
is made, then it may be implicit that the choice is to not limit or modify the security options proffered at that 
step. 
2.4 Security Limits and Choices 
Each requirement provider may specify a choice range for each variant requirement in a given task invoca-
tion. For example, the user selects a range of 50- 80% for packet authentication rate. This choice is passed 
to the next provider (viz., the application) in the sequence. Additionally, each requirement provider may 
have a requirement limit range outside of which it will not accept a request. The limit applies to the request 
choice from the previous provider, e.g., a given application will not accept a range wider than 60- 100% 
from the user. We consider this limit to be valid only if the provider enforces it. 
2Note that it is an implementation detail whether the RMS returns advisory parameters to the application and the application 
invokes the system, or the RMS submits the application with those parameters directly to the system. For simplicity, we assume, 
here, that the RMS submits the application to the system. 
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2.5 Range Relationships Inherent in Task Sequences 
Table 2 shows the various limits and choices we have identified for security requirement providers. 
Table 2: Security Limits and Choices 
User I Task I RMS System 
Choice Range requirement requirement requirernnt Service Level 
Limit Range nla requirement requirement requirement 
Notice that the user does not have an effective limit range, as he has no p-revio'Us p-rovide-r upon whom 
to enforce such a range. Also, the system choice range is the level of service ultimately provided by the 
system in response to the request. This is a unitary range, since there is no next provider to whom a choice 
might be given. 
The question arises as to how these ranges relate to each other. We present the following relationships 
as intuitively inherent in task sequences. However, it is not clear that these relationships are (precisely) 
necessary or sufficient for that purpose; rather, they are provided to explore the semantics of security ranges 
in task sequences. 
• Each provider's choice must be within its own limit. 
This restriction reflects the natural semantics of choices and limits, in that it is natural to respect one's 
own limits. 
• Each choice must be within the previous choice in the sequence 
This reflects a natural protocol to respect the choice of the previous requirement provider: a require-
ment provider will try to fulfill the request of a previous provider. For example in a quality of service 
context, a service provider may accept a request if it can be realized, but it will not proceed with 
wholly divergent parameters. 
• Each choice must be within the next limit in the sequence 
This relation is the consequence of our definition that limits are enforced by their providers. This 
restriction intuitively means that requests which are out of bounds will be rejected. 
• The limits of each provider in a task sequence must all intersect 
This is a consequence of the need for a choice to be within its own limit, and within the next limit, as 
well as within the previous choice. 
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2.6 Further Concepts of Operation 
Requirement choices and limits may be unitary or nil. Unitary means only one value (i.e., no choice) is 
passed to the next requirement provider in the task sequence. A nil range denotes no restriction is imposed 
in the task sequence, and would likely denote acceptance of the previous choice range, such that the previous 
choice is transparently passed through to the next provider. 
3 Formal Representation 
In this section we present a formal representation of the framework developed in Section 2. 
3.1 Goals 
The purpose of formalizing the task sequence model introduced above is to precisely characterize security 
choices for support ofQoSS in metacomputing environments. Furthermore, we wish to provide generality 
such that the model does not limit designs and implementations of the basic concepts, and we want to 
provide consistency such that the model does not require self-contradictions in derived implementations. 
3.2 Range Definitions and Operations 
A range is a set of elements which defines the possible choices of a variant security requirement. More 
than just a set, the elements of a range are related, because some are more secure than others. We will use 
the operator 2:: (dominates) to partially order the elements of a range with respect to relative security. The 
dual of the 2:: operator is the ::; operator. 
These are some example orderings based on such an operator: 
• BlackN et 2:: RedN et 2:: WWW 
- Since BlackN et 2:: RedN et 2:: WWW, we see that subsets of a network may be partially 
ordered by set inclusion. 
• % of packets encrypted 
- This is a linear partial ordering based on numeric value. 
• 3DES 2:: DES 2:: caesar _cipher 
- The strength of encryption algorithms are ordered by crypto-analytic work factor. 
The functions max and min are universal upper and lower bounds on a range: 
Vc: element(e E r-+ max(r) 2:: e) 
Ve: element(e E r-+ min(r) ::; e) 
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The enclosure operator » means range r encloses range s, as follows: 
r » s--+ max(r) 2: max(s) and min(s) 2: min(r) 
The intersection operator 1\ means range r and range s intersect: 
r 1\ s--+ max(r) 2: min(s) and max(s) 2: min(r) 
The sequence function seq(p) provides the following linear ordering on the security providers (p) of a task 
sequence: 
seq( user) < seq( application) < seq(RM S) < seq( system) 
We also represent the set of security requirement providers: 
{u,a, r, s} 
This set represents (respectively) the user, application, RMS and system. 
To represent the security requirement provider choices and limits discussed above, we introduce the 
structure b in Table 3. b consists of two subvectors: one for choice ranges (b.c) and one for limit ranges 
(b.l). 
Table 3: Choices and Limits Represented in Structure b 
Entity Choice Limit 
User b.c.u - user choice range b.I.u- no user limit 
Appln b.c.a - application choice range b.I.a - application limit range 
RMS b.c.r - RMS choice range b.l.r - RMS limit range 
System b.c.s - system response b.I.s - system limit range 
3.3 Expression of System Security 
Previous work has provided an expression for security requirements in a network environment [3]. Briefly, a 
security vector S represents the security requirements involving a task executing in a network environment. 
A security vector component, S.component, contains a boolean statement regarding security requirements 
for a given service or resource. 





level (user) 2 level(resource) 
length of confidentiality encryption key 2 64,::::; 256; inc 64 
%packets authenticated 2 50,::::; 90, inc 10 
authentication header transform in {HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA} 
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Each S.component has at most one variant requirement. Requirements of a given security service may span 
several vector components (indicating a service sub-vector). 
In S.c, "inc 10" indicates that the range from 50 through 90 is quantized into increments of 10, viz: 50, 
60, 70, 80, 90. Later, we will need to indicate the number of quantized steps in the component; to do this, 
one more notational element is introduced, I S.c I· In the above examples, I S.a I= 1, and I S.c I= 5. 
I S.c I = number of quanta in S.c 
When I S.c I> 1, the underlying control program has a range within which it may allow the task to 
execute with respect to the policy requirement. This range corresponds to the ranges in the structure b 
discussed above, but to which range in b does S.c correspond? First, we relate a b structure to each security 
vector component S.c, as follows: 
S.c ~ b 
We wish to measure the effectiveness of the RMS decision/management strategy as reflected in the 
ultimate system choices (b.c.s), but we need to provide a measurement "yardstick." The effects of providers 
who are earlier than the RMS in the task invocation sequence 
user=} application=} RMS =}system 
determine the reduced/restricted requirements perceived by the RMS. That is to say, the user and the ap-
plication may narrow the requirement range such that the requirements are less restrictive3 than the system 
maximum, (max(b.l.s)) and more restrictive than the system minimum (min(b.l.s)), so we will use there-
duction immediately before b.c.r (i.e., b.c.a) as the security metric against which RMS effectiveness is to be 
measured: the value of the requirement S.c is defined to be S.c ~ b.c.a. 
3.3.1 Expression of Range Relationships 
We can now restate the range relationships described previously, using S and b. 
V S: security_ vector, c: service_component( 
/*each provider's choice must be within its own limit*/ 
V p:provider ( 
S.c ~ b.l.p » S.c ~ b.c.p) 
& Vp1,p2:provider( 
/* each choice must be within the previous choice in the sequence */ 
seq(pl) < seq(p2) --+ S.c ~ b.c.p1 » S.c ~ b.c.p2 
/* each choice must be within next limit in the sequence *I 
& seq(pl) < seq(p2) --+ S.c ~ b.l.p2 » S.c ~ b.c.pl 
3Here more restrictive means more security. 
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I* all limit ranges intersect *I 
& S.c f= b.l.pl 1\ S.c f= b.l.p2)) 
3.3.2 Expression of Effective Security 
To see how effectively the RMS applies variant security to tasks, we need to have an expression for the level 
or difficulty of security "met" by a task invocation, with respect to the required security range. 
From above, I< r-ange >I is the number of quanta in "range." 
Let< response >:< range > indicate the ordinal ofthe quantum in a "range" achieved by a system 
"response." For example, if a range was from 3 to 12 in increments of 3 then J (3, 6, 9, 12) I = 4. The 
ordinal of the quantum for 6 is 2, i.e. 6 : (3, 6, 9, 12) = 2, and the ordinal of the quantum for 9 is 3, i.e. 
9 : (3, 6, 9, 12) = 3. 
Then we associate a token (g.c) with each c in S, and define g.c to be the fraction of the required 
security met by a task invocation: 
and 
We know that 
< response >: < range > 
g.c = I< range >I 
requirement = b.c.a (security choice of the application) 
met= b.c.s (service level provided by system) 
So, for example, given S.c such that S.c f= b is defined as follows ... 
b.l.s -system limit range = %packets authenticated ::=: 50,:::; 90, inc 10 
b.c.u -user choice range % packets authenticated ::=: 50, :::; 90 
b.c.a -appl 'n choice range %packets authenticated 2 50,:::; 80 
b.c.r -RMS choice range % packets authenticated 2 50, :::; 70 
b.c.s -system response = % packets authenticated = 70 
(Here, 70 is the third quantum in a range that spans from 50 to 80 in increments of 10.) then we can state: 
b.c.s : b.c.a 3 
g.c = I b I =- = o.75 
.c.a 4 
Notice that g.c = (0 or l) for invariant components. 
With g.c in hand, we introduce a function (A) which averages the tokens of a task [3]: 
A = (gl + 92 + · · + gn) 
n 
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where n equals the number of components inS. (Optionally, one could add weight coefficients to each g to 
indicate relative importance with respect to the security policy.) 
Since an RMS manages the execution of many tasks over a period of time, we wish to examine its 
effectiveness with respect to a group of tasks. If A is derived against n tasks, then As is an expression for 
the overall effective security delivered by the RMS to the n tasks: 
L-}=1 Aj As = ___, _ _..:... 
n 
0 ::::; As ::::; 1, where 1 indicates the maximum scheduling effectiveness. 
4 Conclusion 
We have presented a framework for analysis of security with respect to Quality of Security Service, user 
security choices, and the "task invocation sequence" used in a metacomputer scheduling mechanism (e.g., 
an "RMS"). This framework characterizes the relationships of security requirements of users, applic~tions, 
RMSs, as well as the underlying security resources and services. We then presented a formalization of the 
framework, and extended it to include an expression for the efficiency of an RMS with respect to security, 
which tends to the maximum as security "met" approaches the maximum of the application's choice. 
4.1 Future Work 
We are currently working on several aspects of security regarding the characterization of RMS security, 
security choices, and benefit functions. We are also working on incorporating variant security costing 
techniques into a research prototype of an RMS [9, 3, 17]. 
We would like to understand the completeness of the range relationships identified for task invocation 
sequences. 
We are working to better understand the nature of contradictions which might exist within or between 
security vector components. For example, does there exist a normal form of S whose derivation discovers 
or eliminates contradictions? One such contradiction involves a security component whose provider limits 
(e.g., application limit and RMS limit) do not intersect; another involves two interdependent components 
of a security vector (e.g., a communication authentication service which utilizes a digital integrity service), 
whose limits for a given requirement (e.g., the required ranges for encryption key lengths) do not intersect. 
We would like to incorporate into the benefit function the effects of parallel and redundant security 
mechanisms [7]. 
---------------------------------------------
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